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Abstract. Existing experimental studies mainly focus on motivations and choices of third-
party punishers, but only few of them detect sanction efficacy  contradictory results. Our 
paper wants to shed light on this point. In particular, we want to detect whether the threat of 
being punished for unfair actions is credible and affects subjects’ choices thus, making it 
rational to behave fairly. To disentangle the effect of expected punishment on behaviour, we 
implement in the lab two experimental games - the standard Dictator Game, that is used as 
baseline, and the Third-Party Punishment Game that incorporates a third player who observes 
and may punish the Dictator. The idea is that, if the Dictator in treatment TPP believes 
punishment is a credible threat, s/he may decide to change her/his behaviour, that is, to 
behave generously in order to avoid sanctions. We find a clear gender bias: women reacted to 
the punishment threat by increasing their transfer to the Recipient, while men did exactly the 
opposite.    2
1.0   Introduction 
    The relevant and peculiar role played by social norms in human societies is well-known 
and generally accepted. Consequently, it is not surprising that several interdisciplinary studies 
have been devoted to social norms and to their endogenous enforcement mechanisms. Special 
attention has been given to punishment, given that norms compliance is mainly due to the 
expectations that violations will be sanctioned. In particular, third-party punishment
1  is 
considered the essence of social norms. Its evolutionary dominance with respect to second-
party punishment – especially in large-scale societies – is to be ascribed to the fact that, as 
Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) correctly observe, "if only second parties imposed sanctions, a 
very limited number of social norms could be enforced because norm violations often do not 
directly hurt other people" (p. 64). Even if its costly nature  makes third-party punishment a 
“tendency that would be selected against” (Kurzban et al. 2007 p.75), group selection as well 
as reputation models seem to justify its existence (see for example Barclay, 2006; Boyd et al. 
2003; Gintis, 2000).  
 Though empirical evidence supports the existence of third-party punishment, 
experimental economics makes a meaningful contribution to understanding  how social norms 
emerge and are endogenously enforced. The reason is that, unlike empirical evidence, 
appropriately designed experiments have been the key to rigorously disentangle the different 
forces that drive  norm compliance. In particular, it turns out that: 
a) third-party punishment exists and its strength is proportional to deviance to the norm (see 
for example Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Ottone, 2008);  
b) in-group members are more severely punished than out-group subjects when deviating (see 
for example Shinada et al., 2004; Bernard et al., 2006);  
                                                 
1 Two kind of punishment exists – second-party and third-party. Second-party punishment implies that the victim 
of an unfair action can react and punish the oppressor. Third-party punishment comes from a subject who is not 
directly hurt by the oppressor.   3
c) when third parties have the opportunity not only to punish a deviating subject but also to 
help the victims of injustice, they do that (Ottone, 2008). 
However, what emerges is that existing experimental studies mainly focus on motivations 
and choices of third-party punishers, but only few of them detect sanction efficacy obtaining 
contradictory results (see Charness et al., 2007; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). Our paper wants 
to shed light on this point. In particular, we want to detect whether the threat of being 
punished for unfair actions is credible and affects subjects’ choices thus, making it rational to 
behave fairly.  
To disentangle the effect of expected punishment on behaviour, we implement in the lab 
two experimental games - the standard Dictator Game, that is used as baseline, and the Third-
Party Punishment Game that incorporates a third player who observes and may punish the 
Dictator (see Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). The idea is that, if the Dictator in the TPP 
treatment believes punishment is a credible threat, s/he may decide to change her/his 
behaviour, that is, to behave generously in order to avoid sanctions.
2  
We find a clear gender bias: women reacted to the punishment threat by increasing their 
transfer to the Recipient, while men did exactly the opposite.  
This gender effect is curious but not surprising. Delinquency is more widespread among 
men and a large number of scholars have tried to explain this factor by exploring gender 
issues within deterrence. Emerging results are  not univocal, with  some of these studies 
emphasizing  that women are more likely to perceive higher punishment threats than men (see 
Carmichael, 2004 for a brief survey). This result conforms also to the evidence that women 
are more risk averse (see e.g. Hartog et al., 2002; Agnew et al., 2008, Eckel and Grossman, 
2008) and more sensible to threat of shame and embarrassment (Blackwell, 2000).  
After the introduction, the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the design 
and the procedures. Section 3 is devoted to results and the fourth concludes. 
                                                 
2 In this experiment we refer to monetary sanctions only.   4
2.0  Experimental design and procedures 
    The experimental design consists of two treatments: the Dictator Game (DG) and the 
Third-Party Punishment Game (TPP).  
In the DG, groups of 2 participants were formed (see figure 1) and subjects played a 
Dictator game: player A had the chance of passing money to player B who could not react to 
any decision of her/his partner. In the TPP, groups of 3 participants were formed (see figure 
1) and the Third-Party Punishment Game was implemented. In the first stage player A and 
player B played a Dictator Game, while in the second stage player C entered the game and 
had to decide whether to bear a cost in order to sanction A or to keep the whole initial 
endowment.
34 The strategy method at the Observer's stage was implemented.
5   
In each treatment, subjects were asked to play the game once. In other words, it was a 
one-shot game. At the beginning of the experiment, participants were informed about the 
sequential nature of the game protocol. The instructions were read by participants on their 
computer screen while an experimenter read them loudly. After reading the instructions and 
before subjects were invited to take decisions, some control questions were asked in order to 
be sure that players understood the rules of the game. Then, in each treatment, each subject 
was randomly assigned a role – player A-Dictator or player B-Recipient in the DG and player 
A-Dictator, player B-Recipient or player C-Observer in the TPP. At the end of each session, 
subjects were asked to fill in a brief survey to collect their socio-demographic data. Each 
subject participated in one session only. In order to minimize unobservable variables affecting 
our results (beauty, gender, empathy, etc.) or post-session effects, the complete experiment 
                                                 
3 Instructions do not contain terms such as punish or sanction. We use more neutral term such us deduction. 
4 In each treatment, A's and C's initial endowments are the same (20 tokens), while B's initial endowment is 10 
tokens. Participant C has to pay 1 token to reduce participant A's payoff of 2 tokens. Each token value is 0.50 
Euro. 
5 When the strategy method is used, subjects are asked their choices in each possible scenario. In this case, the 
Observers are asked to declare their level of punishment for each possible transfer from the Dictator to the 
Recipient. The final payoff is determined on the basis of the situation that actually occurs.   5
preserved anonymity among participants.
6 Subjects received their payments after the 
experiment and they were paid by an assistant. Each session lasted for about 20 minutes for 
the DG and 40 minutes for the TPP. Each subject earned on average 7.5 Euros. 
    The experiment was run in the Experimental Economics Laboratory (EELAB), at the 
University of Milano-Bicocca in Milan, Italy. The experiment was programmed and 
conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Overall, 3 sessions for each 
treatment were run, with a total of 175 participants (70 participants in the DG and 105 in the 
TPP), recruited through a web-based recruitment system. In the DG, 66% of participants were 
women, while in the TPP the female representation was 46% of the sample.  
     
3.0 Results 
    This paper explores whether the possibility of being punished by a third party is a credible 
and effective threat for our Dictators. Nash equilibrium predicts that player C will never 
punish player A and, consequently, player A does not anticipate any threat. Hence, player A 
will transfer nothing to player B.  
However, the results showed  that the Observers deviate from the Nash equilibrium by 
punishing selfish Dictators. Given that the actions by players A are observed by players C, the 
question is: may the Dictators anticipate sanctions? If it is the case, they may deviate from the 
predicted behavior and consequently behaving generously. Thus, we checked if there exists 
any difference in Dictators’ behavior under the two treatments. 
Table 1 (columns 1 and 2) and Figure 2 show the results of both treatments. At a first 
sight, there seems to be no significant differences. The average transfer from the Dictator to 
the Recipient is very similar (0.94 in the DG and 1.17 in the TPP), the number of subjects 
playing the Nash equilibrium is fairly the same (around 54% vs. 46%) and even more 
identical is the percentage of dictators using the equal split (2.9% in both cases). Both the 
                                                 
6 In Dufwenberg and Muren (2006) dictators do contributions in front of the audience and subject contribute less.   6
Mann-Whitney (Z = -0.803; p = 0.422) and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (Z = 0.0857; p = 0.979) 
tests do not reject the null hypothesis that the distributions of Dictators' giving in DG and TPP 
are drawn from the same population.  
However, when we detect whether there exists any gender effect, we find out this is the 
case.  We examine both within-treatment and between-treatment differences due to gender.  
First of all, women-Dictators significantly increase their transfer to the Recipients when a 
third subject has the possibility to punish them (average transfer: 0.66 in the DG, 1.63 in the 
TPP; Mann-Whitney test, Z = -2.044, p = 0.04). On the other hand, men-Dictators’ transfer in 
the TPP is slightly and not significantly lower than in the DG (average transfer: 1.09 in the 
DG, 0.62 in the TPP; Mann-Whitney test, Z = 1.236, p = 0.21). Then, when we compare each 
treatment, we find out that in the DG no difference between men and women emerges (Mann-
Whitney test, Z = 0.915, p = 0.36), while in the TPP women transfer significantly more than 
men (Mann-Whitney test, Z = -2.439, p = 0.01). More precisely, we may study how the threat 
of third-party punishment affects deviations from the Nash equilibrium. For men, the threat is 
not very effective since 70% chose the Nash equilibrium. In sharp contrast, the finding is 
exactly the opposite for women: only 26.3% plays according to. See Table 1 and Figure 2 for 
a more detailed description.  
         
4.0  Discussion 
In this paper, we want to detect whether third-party punishment is effective. In particular, 
we want to check whether the possibility for a third party to sanction unfair choices in a 
Dictator Game leads the Dictator to transfer more to the Recipient in order to avoid 
punishment. What we found out is that such a deterrence effect emerges among women only. 
Our result may have a twofold explanation – a methodological and a physiological one. 
On the one hand, it may happen that women are more responsive in the lab than in real-life 
situations. For instance, Levitt and List (2007) find out that women in the lab feel more   7
obligated to behave socially than males. Brañas et al. (2009) confirm their result and they add 
a relevant issue: the sample that is involved in lab experiments belongs to a reduced 
population with peculiar demographic characteristics. This may have some effects when 
analysing differences between genders. In order to test these lab effects, it would be 
interesting to run a field experiment with a wider and more heterogeneous sample, not aware 
of being observed as participants in a scientific study. 
On the other hand, this difference may be intrinsic of human nature. We have a lot of 
evidence that women act differently from men in many situations and they are expected to do 
so (see Aguiar et al., 2009), due to their more fair-minded and risk-averse nature.  
A possible explanation lies exactly in different attitudes when facing risky situations. If 
women are more risk averse, they are more likely to transfer money in order to avoid 
sanctions. Moreover, Eckel and Grossman (2006) report that women are more likely to 
change their behavior according to the situation. It may be the case that, they are more 
sensible to changes in scenarios, in order to avoid negative consequences of wrong behaviour. 
Another possible reason is that implemented punishment is a hard enough  threat to 
women, but not to men. This would explain why boys generally receive more severe 
punishments (Encyclopedia of women and gender, 2002). In line with this hypothesis, it 
would be interesting to check whether there is any kind of gender difference when the third 
party rewards instead of punishing.  
Finally, a possibility is that women perceive the punishment as a norm-enforcement 
device, while men consider it as a mean to increase relative payoffs. In this case, there would 
be no reason for men to increase their transfer. This hypothesis is in line with a previous study 
(Hong and Bohnet, 2007) that reports men as status oriented.    8
References 
•  Agnew, J.R., Anderson, L.R., Gerlach, J.R., and Szykman, L.R. (2008). Who Chooses 
Annuities? An Experimental Investigation of the Role of Gender, Framing, and 
Defaults. American Economic Review, 98, 418–442. 
•  Aguiar F., Brañas, P., Cobo-Reyes, R., Jimenez, N., Miller, L.M. (2009). Are women 
expected to be more generous? Experimental Economics. 12, 93-98. 
•  Barclay, P. (2006). Reputational benefits for altruistic punishment. Evolution and 
Human Behavior, 26, 325-344. 
•  Bernhard, H., Fischbacher, U., Fehr, E. (2006). Parochial altruism in humans. Nature, 
442, 912-915. 
•  Blackwell, B.S. (2000). Perceived Sanction Threats, Sex, and Crime: A Test and 
Elaboration of Power-Control Theory. Criminology 38, 439-488.  
•  Boyd, R., Gintis, H., Bowles, S., & Richerson, P. J. (2003). The evolution of altruistic 
punishment. Proceedings of  the National Academy of Sciences USA, 100, 3531–
3535. 
•  Brañas P., Cardenas, J.C., Rossi, M. (2009). Gender, education and reciprocal 
generosity: Evidence from 1,500 experiment subjects. ECINEQ, working paper 128. 
•  Carmichael S. (2004). Gender differences and perceived sanction threats: the effect of 
arrest ratios Master Thesis, University of California. 
•  Charness, G., Cobo-Reyew, R., Jimenez, N. (2007). An investment game with third-
party intervention. Department of Economic Theory and Economics History, 
University of Granada, ThE Papers, 06/13. 
•  Dufwenberg, M. and Muren, A. (2006). Generosity, Anonymity, Gender. Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization. 61, 42-49 
•  Eckel, C. C., and Grossman, P. J. (1996). Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games. 
Games and Economic Behavior. 16, 181-191. 
•  Encyclopedia Of Women And Gender. Sex Similarities and differences and the impact 
of society on gender. 2002. Volume 1. Academic Press. 
•  Fehr, E. and Fischbacher, U. (2004). Third-party punishment and social norms. 
Evolution and Human Behavior. 25, 63-87. 
•  Fischbacher, U. (2007). Z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic 
experiments. Experimental Economics. 10, 171-178.   9
•  Gintis H. (2000). Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality. Journal of Theoretical 
Biology, 206, 169-79. 
•  Hartog, J., Ferrer-i-Carbonell, A., Jonker, N. (2002). Linking Measured Risk Aversion 
to Individual Characteristics. Kyklos, 55, 3-26. 
•  Hong, K., and Bohnet, I. (2007). Status and Distrust: The Relevance of Inequality and 
Betrayal Aversion. Journal of Economic Psychology, 28, 197-213.  
•  Kurzban, R., DeScioli, P., O’Brien, E. (2007). Audience effects on moralistic 
punishment. Evolution and Human Behavior, 28, 75-84. 
•  Ottone, S. (2008). Are people Samaritans or avengers? Economics Bulletin, 3, 1-8. 
•  Shinada, M., Yamagishi, T., Ohmura, Y. (2004). False friends are worse than bitter 
enemies: “Altruistic” punishment of in-group member. Evolution and Human 
Behavior, 25, 379-393. 
   10
Tables and Figures 
 
   





































Figure 2: Dictators’ transfer by treatment and gender 
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Table 1: Dictators' Behavior 
Donations (in tokens)    DG TPP  DG  TPP 
      M F M F 
0    54.3% 45.7% 47.8% 66.7% 68.8% 26.3%
1    17.1% 17.1% 21.7% 8.3% 12.5% 21.1%
2    17.1% 20.0% 17.4% 16.7% 12.5% 26.3%
3    5.7% 11.4% 4.3% 8.3% 0.0% 21.1%
4    2.9% 2.9% 4.3% 0.0% 6.3% 0.0%
5    2.9% 2.9% 4.3% 0.0% 0.0% 5.3%
         
N    35 35 23 12 16 19 
Mean    0.94 1.17 1.09 0.66 0.62 1.63 
Median    0 1 1 0 0 2 








Average individual transfer from the Dictator to the Receiver 
   M F  Mann-Whitney  test 
DG  1.09 0.66 
TPPG  0.62 1.63 
Mann-Whitney test  p = 0.21  p = 0.04 
p = 0.36 
p = 0.01 
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Instructions 
 
3.1. Instructions for the Dictator Game Treatment 
1.A&B.  Welcome to the experiment, and thank you for participating. Please follow the 
instructions that will appear on your screen. There is nothing complicated, nor tricky 
questions. Your answers will be absolutely anonymous. It will not be possible for the 
experimenters to match the answers with the person who provided them. For the success of 
the experiment, it is necessary that you do not communicate with each other. 
 
2.A&B. The experiment involves two different kinds of participants – Participant A and 
Participant B. At the beginning of the experiment you will be randomly assigned a role (A or 
B) and you will be randomly paired with another participant. You will never know the 
identity of your partner. 
Participant A has an initial endowment of 20 tokens. She has to decide the amount of tokens – 
between 0 and 5 – she wants to transfer to participant B. Participant B has an initial 
endowment of 10 tokens and she cannot take any decision.  
Each token corresponds to 0.5 eurocents. 
 
3.A&B. Payoffs are computed in the following way: 
- payoff of Participant A is the initial endowment of 20 tokens minus the number of tokens 
she transfers to Participant B; 
- payoff of Participant B is the initial endowment of 10 tokens plus the number of tokens she 
receives from Participant A.  
 
4.A&B. In particular, it should be clear that each token Participant A transfers to Participant 
B increases the payoff of Participant B by 1 token – that is, 50 eurocents. 
 
5.A&B. Control questions – see Appendix Figure A.1 
 
6.A. Decision screen for Participant A – see Figure A.2 
6.B.  Waiting screen for Participant B – Participant A is making her choice. Please, wait.  
 
7.A&B. Generally, how many tokens should Participant A send to Participant B? 
 
8.A&B. Payoff screen 
  
9.A&B.  Now we ask you to fill in a brief questionnaire. After that the experiment will 
terminate and you will receive your payment. 
 
3.2. Instructions for the Third-Party Punishment Game Treatment 
1.A&B&C. Welcome to the experiment, and thank you for participating. Please follow the 
instructions that will appear on your screen. There is nothing complicated, nor tricky 
questions. Your answers will be absolutely anonymous. It will not be possible for the 
experimenters to match the answers with the person who provided them. For the success of 
the experiment, it is necessary that you do not communicate with each other. 
 
2.A&B&C. The experiment involves three different kinds of participants – Participant A, 
Participant B and Participant C – and it has a two-stage structure. At the beginning of the first 
stage you will be randomly assigned a role (A, B or C) and you will be randomly paired with 
two participants. You will never know the identity of your partners.   13
In the FIRST STAGE Participant A has an initial endowment of 20 tokens. She has to decide 
the amount of tokens – between 0 and 5 – she wants to transfer to participant B. Participant B 
has an initial endowment of 10 tokens and she cannot take any decision.  
In the SECOND STAGE Participant C has an initial endowment of 20 tokens. She can either 
reduce the payoff of Participant A at a cost – she has to spend 1 token to reduce the payoff of 
Participant A by 2 tokens – or keep the whole endowment. 
To sum up, Participant C can allocate her endowment as she wants by taking into account that 
the sum of the tokens she spends to reduce the payoff of Participant A and she keeps for 
herself cannot be more than 20 tokens. 
Participant C is asked to declare her choice for each possible transfer from Participant A to 
Participant B. The final payoffs are computed on the basis of the actual transfer from 
Participant A to Participant B. Each token corresponds to 0.5 eurocents. 
 
3.A&B&C. Check whether it is clear that: 
- if Participant A transfers 2 tokens to Participant B and Participant C spends 2 tokens to 
reduce the payoff of Participant A, the final payoff will be 14 tokens for Participant A, 12 
tokens for Participant B and 18 tokens for Participant C;  
  - if Participant A transfers 2 tokens to Participant B and Participant C keeps her whole 
endowment, the final payoff will be 18 tokens for Participant A, 12 tokens for Participant B 
and 20 tokens for Participant C;  
 
4.A&B&C. In particular, it should be clear that: 
- each token Participant  A transfers to Participant B increases the payoff of Participant B by 1 
token – that is, 50 eurocents; 
- each token – that is, for each 50 eurocents – Participant C spends reduces the payoff of 
Participant A by 2 tokens – that is, 1 euro. 
 
5.A&B&C. Control questions – see Figure A.3 
 
6.A. Decision screen for Participant A – see Figure A.4 
6.B.  Waiting screen for Participant B – Participant A is making her choice. Please, wait. 
6.C. Decision screen for Participant C – see Figure A.5 
  
7.A&B&C. Generally, how many tokens should Participant A send to Participant B? 
 
8.A&B&C. Payoff screen 
  
9.A&B&C.  Now we ask you to fill in a brief questionnaire. After that the experiment will 
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Figure A.1 – Control questions in the Dictator Game Treatment 
 
 
Figure A.2 – Decision screen of Participant A in the Dictator Game Treatment 
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Figure A.3 – Control questions in the Third-Party Punishment Game Treatment 
 
 
Figure A.4 – Decision screen of Participant A in the Third-Party Punishment Game Treatment  
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Figure A.5 – Decision screen of Participant C in the Third-Party Punishment Game Treatment  
 
 
 
 
 
 